

S E C R E T

8 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office Directors and National Intelligence Officers
Attending the DCI/NIO Meeting at 1300, 8 March

FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator

1. Attached is a point paper for the DCI/NIO meeting. Although it speaks to conventional forces military comparisons, there are analogies in other areas.

2. I recommend that you skim the paper before the meeting and bring it with you to the meeting.

Attachment



25X6

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MILITARY BALANCE PAPERS

The Conventional Forces production program calls for an IIM (in two parts) which would present the NATO Warsaw Pact Balance in Europe. This is intended to follow the completion of NIE 11-14 and IIMs on the military forces of our NATO allies.

Such an assessment is objected to by DIA and the JCS--"development by an intelligence entity of assessments which must consider US military force capabilities go beyond intelligence matters."

The DCI in March 1977 favored limiting US-Soviet comparisons by Intelligence to:

- a. One-on-one analyses of US and Soviet weapons systems as well as net assessments of US and Soviet technological capabilities.
- b. Force interaction analyses (e.g., ICBMs against Minuteman or Soviet Air Defense vs. a mix of bombers, SRAMs and cruise missiles), and
- c. Supported the creation of a national net assessment capability.

In February 1978 the DCI expressed a desire to--"devise (along with OSD) a technique for comparing conventional forces in Europe that could result in as succinct a comparison as...(the) strategic one is."

Attached are some comparisons that are goals for the IIMs on the Balance of Forces in Europe.

Purpose of discussion is to air views on proper limits to be set on Intelligence Community comparative analysis.

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NATO Warsaw Pact Theater Balance in Europe
(Part I : The Central Region and Northern Flank)
(Part II: The Southern Flank)

Comparisons to be Made

- Force generation rate of Pact forces vs. Soviet perception of NATO force generation rate for NIE 4-1 milestones--both ground and air.
- Application of force effectiveness factors to time-related force levels to yield Soviet perceptions of relative force "effectiveness"--both ground and air.
- Apply force effectiveness factors to force trends--ground and air--over long-range past to yield Soviet perception of trend in relative "effectiveness."
- Static comparison of significant combat equipment, manpower, aircraft, naval forces, mobilization potential.
- Comparison of chemical defense capability in terms of relative training effort, decontamination capability.
- Large unit and CPX joint and combined training days.
- Ground attack TACAIR capability in terms of tons deliverable--both the trend and projection.
- Pilot training activity for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, Soviet and non-US NATO pilots against a US pilot standard.
- Expected results in destroying sheltered NATO aircraft and cratering runways (varying a/c mix, tactics, ordnance, runway repair capability, shelter hardness).
- Effect on Pact TACAIR penetration of NATO Air Defenses as a function of varying Pact forces, tactics and suppression ordnance..

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• Extent to which prevailing weather will impede operation of Pact and NATO air forces as a function of ordnance, navigation, fire control and pilot proficiency.